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Abstract
We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices;
the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis,
while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a
myopic profit maximizer at each point of time. Then, we compare the resulting outcomes
with those in a Stackelberg model without price stickiness.
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The last twenty years have witnessed a rapid growth in dierential game theory and
its application to economics. Dierential games have been applied to broad elds of
economics such as industrial organization, environmental economics, and trade theory.
Given the fact that Cournot-Nash duopoly is the simplest and most useful tool that
captures a two-player game, its extensions to dierential games have been intensively
carried out.
Fershtman and Kamien (1987) rst formulate a dierential Cournot-Nash game in
which prices are so sticky that they adjust to the inverse demand only sluggishly. Re-
garding the current price as a state variable, Fershtman and Kamien (1987) examine the
open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. Instead of adopting a guessing method, Tsut-
sui and Mino (1990) nd that there are uncountable nonlinear strategies that characterize
the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium by making use of an auxiliary equation derived from
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.1
On the other hand, there is little work involved in deriving and characterizing the
Stackelberg equilibrium in a dynamic duopoly model. The purpose of this paper is to
take a small step for it. When it comes to a Stackelberg equilibrium in dierential games,
it is natural to consider an open-loop and a feedback Stackelberg equilibria. However,
such a task is extremely dicult since at least four dierential equations arise even in a
two-rm duopoly. In addition, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in general suers
from the problem of time inconsistency.
Invoking these practical diculties, we propose the following game. The follower
chooses the output at each point of time to maximize its instantaneous prot. Then,
its reaction function becomes a function of the leader's output. Taking this reaction
function by the follower, the leader seeks to maximize its discounted sum of prots by
choosing the time prole of outputs. The resulting equilibrium is time consistent since
there is no costate variable that is associated with the follower's problem. Together with
the tractability of our equilibrium concept, this facilitates the analysis and might have a
1Dockner et al. (2000) provide a concise overview of the dynamic duopoly model with sticky prices.
They give a thorough explanation of Tsutsui and Mino's (1990) method of deriving nonlinear feedback
strategies.
2broad applicability.
After the saddle point stability in our Stackelberg game model of duopoly, we compare
the dynamic and static Stackelberg equilibria to explore the long-run consequences of the
leader-follower game. It is shown that the leader produces more in a dynamic Stackelberg
equilibrium than in a static one and the opposite holds for the follower. Moreover, the
equilibrium price in the dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium is lower than that in the static
one. In this sense, dynamic behavior by the leader has an tendency toward a lower price
and the consumer's benet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the base model and
Section 3 derives the dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium. Then, Section 4 compares the
dynamic and static Stackelberg equilibria. Section 5 oers a conclusion.
2 A model
The model to be employed is a dynamic duopoly model rst developed by Fershtman and
Kamien (1987). There are two rms (rms 1 and 2) both of which share the identical





; c > 0; (1)
where xi;i = 1;2 denotes the output of rm i. The market price derived from the
consumer's utility maximization is linear and given by a x1  x2. Following Fershtman
and Kamien (1987) and Tsutsui and Mino (1990), the price adjusts sluggishly and such
an adjustment is captured by a dierential equation:
_ p = s(a   p   x1   x2); s > 0; (2)
where p is the price at each point of time. Then, each rm's instantaneous prot is
dened by





Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Tsutsui and Mino (1990) consider a dierential
game of the above-specied duopoly model. That is, letting r > 0 the common discount





3subject to the price dynamics (2). On the other hand, we consider the following `specic'
Stackelberg game. Assuming that rm 1 leads and that rm 2 follows, rm 2 solves a






p = a   x1   x2:
The resulting solution by rm 2 denes its reaction function as a function of x1: x2 =






 rt1dt; r > 0
subject to _ p = s[a   p   x1   r(x1)]:
This is a standard optimal control problem with Bellman's principle of optimality sat-
ised. Therefore, the equilibrium in our game never suers from the problem of time
consistency.2
3 Dynamic and static Stackelberg equilibria
Having described a basic setting, this section solves the model and derives the equilibrium
output and price. First of all, let us focus on rm 2's problem. Maximizing 2 with respect
to x2 yields the following reaction function by rm 2:
x2 = r(x1) =
a   c   x1
3
: (4)
Firm 1, the leader, solves the above-specied intertemporal prot maximization by
taking account of the follower's reaction function in (4). Substituting (4) into (2), rm














subject to _ p =
s(2a + c   3p   2x1)
3
:
2See Dockner et al. (2000) on the time consistency in an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
4To solve this problem, let us set up the current-value Hamiltonian:





s(2a + c   3p   2x1)
3
;
where  is the costate variable associated with the constraint of price dynamics. Then,
the optimality conditions are obtained as




_  = (r + s)   x1 (6)
_ p =






While there are three unknowns in the above system, one of them can be dropped. To
this end, solve (5) for x1 to get




and substitute (8) into (6) and (7), the present dynamic system becomes two-dimensional
as follows.













  5p + 2a + 3c
!
: (10)
Before proceeding further, let us briey address the stability of the steady state. This
is summarized in:
Proposition 1. The steady state associated with the dynamic system (9) and (10) is
saddle point stable.















which immediately implies the saddle point stability.
5Alternatively, one can obtain the phase diagram which is given by Figure 1, from
which the saddle point stability is also veried geometrically. Q. E. D.
Having the saddle point stability of the steady state, we are now in a position to
derive the steady state output and price. In the steady state in which _  = _ p = 0 and



























3r(2a + 3c) + s(10a + 11c)
3(5r + 7s)
; (12)
where the superscript L denotes the Stackelberg equilibrium with price stickiness. In










(3r + 5s)(a   c)
3(5r + 7s)
: (13)
This completes the derivation of the dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium in our game.
On the other hand, the static Stackelberg equilibrium is easily obtained by making

















One can verify that these price and outputs are also obtained by solving a standard
Stackelberg game with rm 1 the leader and rm 2 the follower. That is, they are
obtained by solving
max




subject to x2 = r(x1) =
a   c   x1
3
p = a   x1   x2:
6Note that these results can also be obtained by setting s ! 1 because the prices adjust
instantaneously to the inverse demand in a static Stackelberg model.3
4 Comparison between static and dynamic equilibria
The preceding sections have concentrated on the derivation and characterization of the
dynamic and static Stackelberg equilibria.4 Based on them, we are now ready to under-
take the main task: comparison between the dynamic and static Stackelberg equilibria.
They are stated in:
Proposition 2. On the comparison between the dynamic and static Stackelberg equilib-





Proof. Subtracting pS (resp. xS
1 and xS

























which immediately leads to the proposition. Q. E. D.
In our game, rm 1 maximizes the discounted stream of prots. This dynamic behavior
makes its output larger than that obtained in a static Stackelberg game. This, in turn,
makes the follower supply less and the price lower. That is, the leader's position in a
whole game is stronger in a dynamic game than in a static game. This results in a
lower price, from which the consumer benets more in a dynamic equilibrium than in a
static one. In other words, the existence of a long-farsighted rm is likely to benet the
consumer.
3For this point, see Dockner et al. (2000).
4The term `dynamic' refers to the situation in which rm 1 solves an intertemporal prot maximization
problem, whereas `static' indicates dynamic optimization by neither rm.
7Remark. It is well-known that the leader supplies more than the follower in Stackelberg















(3r + s)(a   c)
3(5r + 7s)
> 0:
In this sense, the well-known feature on the inter-rm output dierential in the static
Stackelberg game carries over to the present dynamic framework. In other words, in both
cases, the leader has an incentive to a larger output than the follower.
5 Concluding remarks
We have formulated a tractable Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky
prices. Although we recognize that the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is more a desir-
able and appropriate concept to fully explore the dynamic aspects of oligopolistic com-
petition, our approach might have a role of connecting two extreme equilibria: static
Stackelberg equilibrium and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. As has been stressed re-
peatedly, our concept of the dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium passes time consistency as
well as tractability. In addition, it is saddle point stable, which makes comparative statics
easy. We hope that our equilibrium concept would be applied to various elds including
public economics, environmental economics, and international trade.
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Figure 1: The phase diagram
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